Moral Rights of Composers: The Protection of Attribution and Integrity Available to Musicians in the European Union and the United States by Petrik, Tanja Makovec
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 22 Volume XXII 
Number 2 Volume XXII Book 2 Article 4 
2012 
Moral Rights of Composers: The Protection of Attribution and 
Integrity Available to Musicians in the European Union and the 
United States 
Tanja Makovec Petrik 
Petrik Law Firm 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tanja Makovec Petrik, Moral Rights of Composers: The Protection of Attribution and Integrity Available to 
Musicians in the European Union and the United States, 22 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 359 
(2012). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol22/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Moral Rights of Composers: The Protection of Attribution and Integrity Available 
to Musicians in the European Union and the United States 
Cover Page Footnote 
Owner of Petrik Law Firm, New York; LL.M., Fordham University School of Law; LL.B., University of 
Ljubljana Law Faculty. My sincere thanks to Professor Pablo Palazzi for his helpful observations in 
preparing this Article and the editors and staff of the IPLJ for their hard work. 
This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol22/iss2/4 
MAKOVEC.FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012 10:44 AM 
 
359 
Moral Rights of Composers: 
The Protection of Attribution and  
Integrity Available to Musicians in the 
European Union and  the United  States 
 
Tanja Makovec Petrik* 
 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the approaches taken 
in the European Union and the United States to protect moral 
rights of musicians, specifically the right of integrity, and to give a 
sense of a possible future trend in the development of this issue.  
Currently, the United States protects an author’s right of integrity 
through other legal frameworks, like contract law or defamation, 
but does not expressly recognize moral rights.  This paper 
proposes that the United States adopt a middle ground approach, 
like that taken by the United Kingdom, and provide limited, but 
explicit, moral rights protection to musical composers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Creativity as expressed through art is a special virtue. Apart 
from its important meaning for society,
1
 creativity also represents 
an intimate realization of an author‘s personality and 
individuality.
2
  The importance of protecting creativity has 
different meanings depending on the perspective taken. From the 
artist‘s point of view, it stimulates his work; from a legal point of 
view, it forms the foundation for the special status of the creation. 
 
 1 Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States 
and the United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities Under the U.K.’s New 
Performances Regulations, 24 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 213, 219 (2006) (―The supremacy of the 
creator‘s personhood is essential for promoting a climate of intellectual creativity in 
society.‖) (citing Gregory M. Duhl, Old Lyrics, Knock-off Videos, and Copycat Comic 
Books: The Fourth Fair Use Factor in U.S. Copyright Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 665, 
705 (2004)); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 
1533 (1989); Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 43–44 (1998). 
 2 See Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 218 (referencing Monica E. Anteza, Note, The 
European Union Internet Copyright Directive as Even More than it Envisions: Toward a 
Supra-EU Harmonization of Copyright Policy and Theory, 26 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L. 
REV. 415, 421 (2003)); see also Duhl, supra note 1, at 706; Lacey, supra note 1, at 1548–
49. 
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Civil law countries typically advance the issue of protection of 
an artist‘s creativity through a dualistic approach.3  These countries 
recognize both the artist‘s economic or property interests and his 
moral or personal rights within the same copyright protection.
4
  
Conversely, common law countries approach the issue from a 
monistic perspective, affording artists copyright protection for their 
economic and property interests, while leaving moral rights 
protection at ―the mercy of‖ other legal institutions.5  Thus, the 
European legal system, with the exception of the United 
Kingdom,
6
 includes moral rights as part of its statutory copyright 
law, whereas the legal system in the United States attempts to 
afford similar protection through defamation, unfair competition, 
privacy, right to publicity and other bodies of law, but it does not 
recognize moral rights as such. 
When discussing moral rights one should first distinguish 
between moral rights as a set of rules and moral rights as a concept 
that protects an artist‘s relationship to his work.7  To examine 
whether the United States as a common law country in fact needs 
to adopt the civil system‘s moral rights regime, this paper will look 
at the level of protection currently available in the United States 
and investigate if artists‘ rights can be enhanced and adequately 
protected without introducing the new concept of moral rights. 
The paper is divided into three parts.  Part I introduces the 
nature of moral rights, including what musicians seek to have 
protected by them and the incentives of this protection.  Part II 
examines the current status of moral rights protection 
internationally, and specifically focuses on the distinctions 
between the different approaches taken in the European Union and 
 
 3 See J. Carlos Fernàndez-Molina & Eduardo Peis, The Moral Rights of Authors in the 
Age of Digital Information, 52 J. AM. SOC‘Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 109, 112 (2001).  
Countries taking a dualistic approach include: France, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal; those taking a monistic approach include: Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. 
 4 Id.  
 5 Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 213–14. 
 6 It should be noted that my focus on the European system excludes the United 
Kingdom because it is a common law country. 
 7 See generally Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT‘L 
L.J. 353 (2006) (recognizing this approach). 
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in the United States.  This section also highlights the ―philosophy‖ 
and tradition behind both approaches.  Part III consists of a 
comparative analysis of the Shostakovich case as litigated in the 
United States and in France, as well as two cases involving 
American musician Tom Waits, one litigated in the United States, 
and the other in Spain.  The paper concludes by foreshadowing an 
increase in American artists litigating overseas to protect the rights 
that current U.S. law fails to adequately recognize. 
I. THE NATURE OF MORAL RIGHTS 
Moral rights are distinct from the economic rights associated 
with a particular copyrighted work.  Moral rights provide 
protection to the author based on the intimate link between his 
work and himself as the creator.
8
  These rights are understood to be 
an extension of the author‘s personhood.9 
In this respect, moral rights afford the work a status that treats 
it as a special category of property.  Under a moral rights regime, 
the author retains a degree of control over his work even if he 
commercially exploits the creation by transferring his economic 
interests to a third party.  This means that, for instance, a composer 
can invoke his moral rights to ensure that he is always recognized 
as the author, or to prevent distortion or mutilation of the piece 
even if he transferred his economic rights to a third person or 
entity.
10
  Therefore, in certain cases, moral rights defend artists‘ 
rights against the contract or property interests of third parties.
11
 
 
 8 Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and 
Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 
595 (2006) (citing Register of Copyrights, Report on the General Revision of the U.S. 
Copyright Law (1961)).  
 9 See id. at 596–97.  Moral rights are distinguishable from personality rights in that 
they relate to an outer object (art work) as opposed to being solely inherent in an author‘s 
individuality.  Another distinction is the fact that moral rights can be attributed to legal 
entities.  
 10 Patrick G. Zabatta, Note, Moral Rights and Musical Works: Are Composers Getting 
Berned?, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1096–97 (1992). 
 11 Piotraut, supra note 8, at 595.  This tension between the property interests of third 
parties and artists‘ moral rights is a significant drawback in common law countries. 
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The four protections encompassed within the notion of moral 
rights are: the right of disclosure, the right of withdrawal, the right 
of attribution, and the right to integrity.
12
  The right of disclosure
13
 
(divulgation) allows an author to determine the circumstances 
whereby his work will be presented to the public.
14
  It is based on 
the presumption that only the author knows when the work is 
―complete and therefore ready to be published or reviewed by the 
public.‖15  The right of withdrawal (retraction) provides the author 
with the option of removing his works from the public and refusing 
to create additional works.
16
  The right of attribution (paternity) 
protects the ability of the author to claim authorship of his work.
17
  
The right of integrity ensures respect for the author‘s work, so that 
it cannot be mutilated, distorted, altered, or destroyed.
18
  It also 
prohibits presenting a work in a ―derogatory manner contrary to 
the intentions of the creator.‖19 
In the United States, judges have created what purport to be the 
equivalents of these four rights: ―a right to disclose or first publish 
a work, a right of modification or withdrawal of a work . . . a right 
to prevent excessive criticism of a work, and a right against false 
 
 12 Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 221.  Additional moral rights protections exist such as 
the protection from misattribution, the right to anonymous or pseudonymous status, the 
right to prevent excessive criticism, and the right to additional royalties for the 
subsequent resale of works.  
 13 Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 222 (citing Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights 
Protection in the United States Under the Berne Convection: A Fictional Work?, 12 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 1206 (2002) (―Michelangelo asserted 
his right of disclosure while finishing the ceiling of the Sistine chapel, by refusing Pope 
Julius II access to the unfinished murals.‖)). 
 14 See Piotraut, supra note 8, at 597. 
 15 Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 220.  
 16 See Piotraut, supra note 8, at 597; see also Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 220–21. 
 17 See Piotraut, supra note 8, at 597.  
 18 See id.; see also Liemer, supra note 1, at 50–51; Calvin D. Peeler, From the 
Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and French Moral Rights), 9 IND. INT‘L & 
COMP. L. REV. 423, 449 (1999).  
 19 Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 221 (citing Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and 
the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5, 8–9 
(1985)); Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 795, 802 (2001); Brandon G. Williams, Note, James Brown v. In-Frin-JR: How 
Moral Rights Can Steal the Groove, 17 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 651, 657–58 (2000); 
see also Lacey, supra note 1, at 1549. 
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attribution.‖20  But these judicially-created expansions of 
copyrights do not provide the same protections as a regime that 
explicitly recognizes moral rights. 
II. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
THE APPROACHES TAKEN IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
UNITED STATES TO PROTECT MORAL RIGHTS 
A.  International Perspective 
Internationally, relevant moral rights provisions are detailed in 
article 6bis of the Berne Convention and article 5 of the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (―WPPT‖).21  Completed in 
1986, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works
22
 is an international agreement that governs 
copyright issues. Its moral rights provision was added in 1928 and 
―is universally understood as codifying the moral rights of 
attribution and integrity.‖23  Furthermore, it expressly provides that 
moral rights are independent of ―economic rights.‖  Article 6bis 
reads: 
 
 20 Piotraut, supra note 8, at 597–98 (citing Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the 
Author: Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 
229, 230 (1995)). 
 21 The Universal Copyright Convention of 1952 does not contain a moral rights 
provision. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, revised July 
24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341.  The TRIPS Agreement of 1994 excludes moral rights from its 
enforcement.  Although Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement establishes a general 
obligation to comply with article 6bis (―members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 
. . . .‖), it excludes article 6bis from its enforcement mechanisms (―members shall not 
have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under 
Article 6bis of that [Berne] Convention or the rights derived therefrom.‖). Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (―TRIPS‖), art. 9 (1), Apr. 15. 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81.  The WIPO Copyright 
Treaty incorporates compliance with articles 1 to 21 of the Berne Convention, but does 
not contain any additional provisions of moral rights. WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 1 (4), 
Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76. 
 22 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
art. 6bis, , Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1886) [hereinafter The Berne 
Convention]. 
 23  Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 356. 
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Independently of the author‘s economic rights, and 
even after the transfer of the said rights, the author 
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work 
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
24
 
This section of the Berne Convention indicates that ―these 
moral rights should last as long as the protections of economic 
rights in signatory nations, or, at a minimum, until the death of the 
creator of the artistic work.‖25  Thus, the Convention leaves the 
implementation of moral rights protection to the individual 
signatory nations.
26
 
The 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
27
 
(―WPPT‖) follows the language of the Berne Convention in the 
context of music and other performances and protects the rights of 
attribution and integrity of performers including musicians, 
singers, and producers of sound recordings.
28
  Article 5(1) reads: 
Independently of a performer‘s economic rights, 
and even after the transfer of those rights, the 
performer shall, as regards his live aural 
performances or performances fixed in phonograms, 
 
 24 The Berne Convention, supra note 22, at art. 6bis, section 2.  
 25 Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 224–25 (referencing The Berne Convention, art. 6bis, 
section 2).  
The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding 
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the 
expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons 
or institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where 
protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at 
the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not 
provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights 
set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these 
rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained. 
Id. 
 26 The Berne Convention, supra note 22, at art. 6bis, section 3 (―The means of redress 
for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of 
the country where protection is claimed.‖). 
 27 World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT]. 
 28 Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 226. 
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have the right to claim to be identified as the 
performer of his performances, except where 
omission is dictated by the manner of the use of the 
performance, and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of his 
performances that would be prejudicial to his 
reputation.
29
 
The vague language used in both international provisions (a 
modification that is ―prejudicial to his honor or reputation‖) allows 
for different interpretations of moral rights.  This ambiguity is 
precisely why the application of moral rights protection throughout 
the world calls for a universal agreement on the appropriate scope 
of moral rights protection. 
B. The European Approach 
Despite the continuous efforts of legal unification throughout 
the European Union and, for the most part, a successfully 
harmonized copyright law, moral rights in the European Union 
remain ―un-harmonized.‖30  Moral rights in the European context 
are ―generally conceptualized as inalienable rights of authors in 
their work.‖31  In order to qualify as a moral right, three legal 
characteristics must be recognized: 
First, moral rights are rights of authors, which is to 
say that only those human beings who actually 
create the work in question qualify as owners of 
moral rights.  Therefore, corporate entities and 
employers who hire third parties to create works for 
them do not qualify as authors. . . . Second, moral 
rights are rights in copyrightable works, which is 
why moral rights law is considered an integral part 
 
 29 WPPT, supra note 27, ch. II., art. 5 (1).  
 30 See Council Directive 93/98/EEC, art.21, 1993 O.J. L 290 9-13 (―Whereas it is 
useful to make clear that the harmonization brought about by this Directive does not 
apply to moral rights‖).  
 31 Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 359 (citing John Henry Merryman, The Moral Right of 
Maurice Utrillo, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 445, 446 (1995); Neil Netanel, Alienability, 
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental 
Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1994)).  
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of copyright law—the body of law governing rights 
in works of authorship.  This is also the reason why 
France, Germany, and Italy decided to protect moral 
rights by modifying their copyright acts as opposed 
to enacting new non-copyright statutes or inserting 
them into pre-existing statutes outside copyright, 
such as their civil codes. . . . Third, moral rights are 
inalienable in the sense that they can be neither 
transferred to third parties nor relinquished 
altogether.  They are personal to the author.
32
 
Regarding inalienability, although authors cannot assign or 
waive their moral rights (in contrast to copyrights), they can agree 
not to enforce them, which is in fact quite common.
33
  
Inalienability allows authors to bring claims against parties to 
whom they have transferred their copyright, leading some scholars 
to argue that it is the characteristic of moral rights that ―interferes 
with the principle of freedom of contract.‖34 
French and Spanish copyright law both follow this concept of 
inalienability.  The French Intellectual Property Code provides that 
―[a]n author shall enjoy the rights to respect for his name, his 
authorship and his work . . . . This right shall attach to his 
person . . . . It shall be perpetual, inalienable and 
imprescriptible.‖35  With regard to the right of integrity, the French 
Code further provides that ―[d]estruction of the master copy of 
such version shall be prohibited . . . . Any change made to that 
version by adding, deleting or modifying any element thereof shall 
require the agreement of the persons.‖36 
 
 32 Id. at 359–62. See also ANDRE LUCAS & HENRI-JACQUES LUCAS, TRAITE DE LA 
PROPRIETE LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUES 307 (2d ed. 2001); ARTHUR MILLER & MICHAEL 
H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 425 (3d ed. 2000); William W. Fisher, Theories of 
Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 
168, 174 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).  
 33 See id. But see Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 229 (―French Courts have allowed 
some limited waivers in contracts if the courts viewed those waivers as reasonable and 
not substantive alternations or distortions of the creative work.  Blanket waivers on future 
changes or uses of a creative work, however, are unenforceable.‖). 
 34 Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 361. 
 35 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle [C. Propriété Intellectuelle] art. L.121-1 (Fr.), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=5563 (English translation).   
 36 Id. at art L. 121-5. 
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Applying the French approach, a composer may object to the 
use of his music in a film, television broadcast, or live 
performance.  A musician or composer ―[m]ay seek to block the 
exploitation of her work through digital sampling of pieces of that 
work into another song.‖37  Musicians and composers may also 
―try to stop the downloading of their music from online media 
services.‖38 
French copyright law influenced Spain‘s copyright law. Under 
Spanish Intellectual Property Law, the author has an indispensable 
and inalienable right to demand recognition of his authorship of the 
work, demand respect for the integrity of the work, and prevent 
any distortion, modification, alteration, or attack of the work, 
which might prejudice his legitimate interest or undermine the 
work‘s reputation.39 
C. The American Approach 
The United States does not recognize the notion of moral rights 
as such, but rather seeks ―to promote the public good through 
granting economic incentives for creative endeavors.‖40  The 
United States purports to enforce what is sought to be protected by 
moral rights through other principles and institutes (bodies of law) 
such as defamation, misrepresentation, unfair competition, right to 
privacy, right to publicity, and other civil causes of action.
41
 
However, there is a widely held belief that United States 
copyright legislation does not comply with article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention.
42
  When the United States joined the Berne 
Convention in 1988 it made it clear that no expansion of moral 
rights was intended by the United States‘ accession to the treaty.43  
 
 37 Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 230.  
 38 Id. 
 39 Intellectual Property Law art. 14 (B.O.E. 1996, 1/1996) (Spain). available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=126674 (English translation). 
 40 Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 247. 
 41 Henry L. Self III, Moral Rights and Musicians in the United States, in 2003-2004 
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING & THE ARTS HANDBOOK 165, 168 (2003).   
 42 See Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 252.  
 43 See Zabatta, supra note 10, at 1098–99. 
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The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988
44
 expressly 
stipulated that the Convention is not self-executing.
45
  By doing so, 
the United States maintained its position that what are understood 
as ―moral rights‖ elsewhere are adequately protected in the United 
States by other principles of law. 
Some states, however, did take it upon themselves to provide 
some moral rights protection.  Puerto Rico and fourteen states 
enacted legislation providing limited protection for the rights of 
integrity and attribution, among other rights.
46
  However, in many 
cases, the protection was limited.  For example, only Puerto Rico‘s 
moral rights laws protected musical works.
47
 
Federal law came to recognize moral rights in the Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (―VARA‖).48  In addition to largely 
preempting state law and offering less generous moral rights,
49
 
VARA offers protection only to works of visual art.
50
  Thus, the 
statutory provision relating to the rights of attribution and integrity 
in the United States is expressly limited to visual artists.
51
  All 
other works, such as musical compositions, must rely on other 
legal concepts. 
1. Protection for Musical Works 
United States Copyright Law does implicitly guarantee a 
certain level of integrity to a composition through compulsory 
licensing.
52
  Title 17, Section 115 of the United States Code, 
concerning the exclusive rights in nondramatic musical works, 
allows a third person to acquire a compulsory license from a 
 
 44 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 
2853 (1988). 
 45 Id. § 2(1).  
 46 See Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 254. 
 47 See id. at 255. 
 48 See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128; see also 
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2010). 
 49 See Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 259–60 (―Under VARA, artists‘ rights are 
alienable by written contract provided that the waiver identifies the work and its agreed-
upon uses.‖).   
 50 See Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 258. 
 51 See Piotraut, supra note 8, at 600. 
 52 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010). 
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copyright owner which permits the third party to sing, perform or 
record an original composition, referred to as a ―cover song.‖53  
There is no requirement that the new version be identical to the 
previous work, as the compulsory license includes the privilege of 
rearranging the work, creating the recording artist‘s own 
interpretation of the original.  Nevertheless, there are limits to the 
modifications allowed, namely that the new version cannot 
―change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work.‖54  
Therefore, a licensee is prohibited from drastically altering the 
work ―and must cover the work in a way that remains faithful to 
the copyright owner‘s original creation.‖55 
Factually for several reasons, the right of integrity within the 
compulsory licensing regime does not afford much protection to 
musicians. First, it is very limited in scope in terms of prohibiting 
modifications.
56
  Compulsory mechanical licenses protect against 
only a ―fundamental change‖; compulsory performance licenses 
protect against unauthorized performances and are not concerned 
with the artistic integrity of the musical work.
57
  Second, 
compulsory licenses are an inaccurate reflection of the moral rights 
doctrine because they protect the copyright owners and not the 
authors, but the copyright owner is often not the actual creator.
58
  
Furthermore, ―the creator still loses all of her discretion and 
control over her musical work when required to license away her 
creation.‖59  Because composers ―cannot invoke its protection . . . 
songwriters must still rely on the patchwork of pseudo-moral rights 
protection . . . to vindicate their rights of attribution and 
integrity.‖60 
 
 53 Id. at § 115(a)(2).  See also Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 250. 
 54 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2010). 
 55 Rajan Desai, Music Licensing, Performance Rights Societies, and Moral Rights for 
Music: A Need in the Current U.S. Music Licensing Scheme and a Way to Provide Moral 
Rights, 10 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.  1, 5–6 (2001) (citing CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., 
COPYRIGHT LAW 207, 178 (5th ed. 2000)). 
 56 See Desai, supra note 55, at 8. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 250. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Zabatta, supra note 10, at 1101. 
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While not expressly grounding its holding in the moral rights 
doctrine, the Second Circuit in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting 
Company
61
 alluded to the concept of moral rights.
62
  In Gilliam, 
American Broadcasting Company (ABC) obtained a license from 
the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) to broadcast a popular 
British show, Monty Python.
63
  However, before broadcasting, 
ABC shortened and edited the show to accommodate commercials, 
prompting Monty Python to seek an injunction.
64
 
The court held that ―American copyright law, as presently 
written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of 
action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the 
economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors.‖65  So, Monty 
Python was not able to claim a violation of its moral rights.  
However, Monty Python did succeed in its claim based in 
trademark law, not copyright law.  The court held that Monty 
Python had successfully made out a claim under section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act regarding misappropriation of an author‘s work 
that creates a false impression of the product‘s origin.66  The 
Lanham Act, section 43(a) provides: ―Any person who shall affix, 
apply, annex or use . . . a false designation of origin, or any false 
description of representation . . . shall be liable for civil action.‖67  
 Although section 43 governs false and misleading advertising 
and can provide a composer with protection against the 
impermissible alterations of his works, like the protection provided 
by the right of integrity, it cannot be used to create a moral right 
for works that fall outside of the Act.
68
  Ultimately, the decision 
illustrates that other legal concepts and provisions can be used to 
protect what the moral right of integrity seeks to protect, but only 
to a limited and restricted extent.
69
 
 
 61 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 62 Id. at 24–25. See also Piotraut, supra note 8, at 605. 
 63 See Piotraut, supra note 8, at 605. 
 64 See id.  
 65 Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24. 
 66 See Piotraut, supra note 8, at 604–05. 
 67 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 68 Suhl, supra note 13, at 1225–28. 
 69 See Piotraut, supra note 8, at 604–05.  
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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit quasi-recognized the right of 
attribution in Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corporation.
70
  
Plaintiffs brought a claim under the Lanham Act, asserting the 
failure to attribute authorship for two of their songs.
71
  The facts of 
the case showed that Lamothe, Jones, and Crosby coauthored two 
songs, and after the band split up, Crosby joined another group and 
licensed both songs.
72
  The licenses for the songs attributed 
authorship of the music and lyrics to Crosby, and omitted the credit 
due to Lamothe and Jones.
73
  The court acknowledged artists‘ 
―legitimate interest in protecting their work from being falsely 
designated‖ and thus accorded protection to Lamothe and Jones 
under the Lanham Act.
74
  The court stated plainly that the 
defendants violated the Lanham Act by ―depriv[ing] Lamothe and 
Jones of recognition and profits from the release of the two songs 
that were their due.‖75 
Similarly, in Franconero v. Universal Music Corporation,
76
 
Mrs. Francis, a renowned singer in 1950s and 1960s, claimed that 
the defendant‘s actions violated her moral rights.77  In the 1990s, 
Universal Music Corporation (UMC) licensed
78
 synchronization 
rights allowing Francis‘ music to be used in a film that featured 
scenes of homosexuality, suicide, prostitution, and rape.
79
  Among 
other claims, Francis asserted a moral rights claim for improper 
licensing of her songs.
80
  Considering that Francis had been raped 
and tortured, the context in which her songs were licensed was 
especially objectionable.
81
  Nevertheless, in its analysis the court 
 
 70 847 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. at 1405 (stating that the band coauthored the songs entitled ―Scene of the 
Crime‖ and ―I‘m Insane‖). 
 73 See id.  
 74 Id. at 1406. 
 75 Id. at 1407. 
 76 No. 02CV1963, 2003 WL 22990060 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003). 
 77 See id. at *1. 
 78 Mrs. Francis transferred the rights in her music to UMC, with Francis receiving 
royalties from UMC‘s licensing of such music.  
 79  Franconero, 2003 WL 22990060, at *1 (stating that UMC allowed the music to be 
used in the films ―Jawbreaker‖ and ―Postcards from America‖). 
 80 See id. at *2. 
 81 In 1974, Francis was raped and tortured. See id. at *1.   
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dismissed the moral rights claim reiterating that ―United States law 
does not recognize moral rights with respect to vocal 
performances, and only recognizes moral rights claims as to visual 
arts that have been altered or deformed.‖82  Mrs. Francis‘ claims 
might have been better founded if, for example, she had asserted 
infringement of her privacy or publicity rights or even defamation. 
Despite the availability of limited legal alternatives, composers 
are further disadvantaged by VARA‘s narrow scope.  Specifically, 
restrictive interpretations of VARA affect the use of alternative 
legal measures by those artists who are unprotected by VARA, 
namely musical composers.
83
 
[I]t appears that these authors are negatively 
affected by the existence of moral rights statutes 
that exclude them because their exclusion invites 
the argument that since Congress intended to limit 
moral rights protection to a small subset of authors 
and works, it must have intended not to provide 
such protection to authors and works not covered by 
the statute.
84
 
In Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corporation, Justice Scalia stated that recognizing a cause of 
action for misrepresentation of authorship in section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act would render the limitations of VARA superfluous,
85
 
and ―[a] statutory interpretation that renders another statute 
superfluous is of course to be avoided.‖86 
 
 82 Franconero, 2003 WL 22990060, at *2. 
 83 See Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 407–12. 
 84 Id. at 407 (emphasis added).  This understanding is illustrated in Lee. v A.R.T. Co., 
125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) (―It would not be sound to use § 106(2) to provide artists 
with exclusive rights deliberately omitted from [VARA].‖). 
88  See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT OF INTEGRITY OF 
MUSICIANS 
A. Shostakovich Case 
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
87
 which 
was litigated in the United States in 1948 and again in France in 
1953, best illustrates the differences between the American and 
French treatments of the right to integrity.  In this case, Russian 
composers
88
 objected to the use of their music in a movie
89
 which 
they believed had an anti-Soviet theme.
90
 
In the United States, the court held that the composers had not 
been libeled through the film‘s use of their compositions or 
attributions and denied the motion to enjoin the use of plaintiffs‘ 
public domain musical compositions and their names in the 
movie.
91
  The court described the use of the music as an incidental, 
background matter and declared, ―the music . . . is in the public 
domain and enjoys no copyright protection . . . .‖92  In its 
reasoning, the court made a reference to the doctrine of moral 
rights and acknowledged that ―under the doctrine of Moral Right 
the court could . . . prevent the use of a composition or work, in the 
public domain, in such a manner as would be violative of the 
author‘s rights.‖93  However, the court concluded that ―[i]n the 
present state of our law the very existence of [this] right is not 
clear.‖94 
 
 87 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948), aff’d, 275 A.D. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1949). 
 88 These four composers were Dmitry Shostakovich, Aram Khachaturian, Serge 
Prokofiev, and Nikolai Myaskovsky. 
 89 THE IRON CURTAIN (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1948). 
 90 See Shostakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 578. 
 91 See id. at 579. 
 92 Id. at 577.  The court furthermore denied protection based on the Civil Rights Law, 
saying that uncopyrighted material is not protected from an invasion of the right of 
privacy.  The court also denied the libel claim by saying there is no necessary implication 
that they had given consent to the use of their music because the music is in the public 
domain.  ―In the absence of such implication the existence of libel is not shown.‖ See id. 
at 577–78. 
 93  Id.  
 94 Id. at 578–79. 
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In addition, the court alluded to the delicate balance between 
the public interest and the interest of authors when a work is in the 
public domain, and questioned what standards should be used to 
determine whether authors‘ moral rights have been violated under 
those circumstances.
95
  Ultimately, the court found no right to 
artistic integrity under United States law.  Interestingly, the same 
facts were litigated in France and resulted in an attribution of 
moral rights.  In Soc. Le Chant de Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe et 
Soc., the court found ―moral damage‖ and expressly acknowledged 
the composers‘ moral rights by granting the artists‘ claim.96 
B. Moral Rights Reasoning in Claims of Voice Misappropriation 
and False Endorsement 
Similarly, two related cases involving voice misappropriation 
and imitation were litigated in the United States in 1993 and then 
in Spain in 2005.  Both suits involved singer Tom Waits, who is 
popularly known to disfavor using art for commercial purposes.
97
 
In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
98
 the Ninth Circuit affirmed an 
award of damages to Tom Waits based on voice 
misappropriation.
99
  When Frito-Lay introduced a new Doritos 
product, its advertising agency found inspiration in Waits‘ 1976 
song ―Step Right Up.‖  The commercial written by the agency 
mimicked the feel of Waits‘ song.  In fact, the agency hired a 
professional musician who had been performing Waits‘ songs for 
over ten years and had developed an imitation of Waits‘ voice.100  
More than two hundred and fifty radio stations located in sixty-one 
markets nationwide broadcast the advertisement over the course of 
two months in 1988.
101
  Upon hearing the commercial, Waits 
 
 95 See id. (―Is the standard to be good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs, moral 
concepts or what is it to be?‖). 
 96 Cour d‘appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 1e ch., Jan. 13, 1953, Gaz. Pal. 
1953, 2, 191 (Fr.). 
 97 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 98 Id. at 1093. 
 99 See id. at 1096, 1112.  The court held that Waits‘ separate Lanham Act claim was 
legally sufficient, but vacated damages on the claim because they were duplicative. See 
id. at 1112. 
 100 Id. at 1097. 
 101 See id. 
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believed that anyone who heard the ad would assume he was 
endorsing the company.
102
 
Waits sued the advertising agency and Frito-Lay, bringing 
claims for both voice misappropriation under California state law 
and false endorsement under the Lanham Act.
103
  At the trial level, 
the jury ―found that the defendants had violated Waits‘ right of 
publicity by broadcasting a commercial which featured a deliberate 
imitation of Waits‘ voice.‖104  In reviewing the case, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered Waits‘ cause of action as 
―contain[ing] elements, such as an invasion of personal rights . . . 
that are different in kind from copyright infringement‖105 and 
stated that Waits‘ right to control the use of his identity as 
embodied in his voice had been invaded.
106
  Using reasoning 
closely resembling the notion of moral rights, the court continued, 
stating ―[w]hat is put forward as protectable here is more personal 
than any work of authorship . . .  A voice is as distinctive and 
personal as a face.‖107 
It is important to note that at issue in Waits was imitation as an 
infringement of voice.  Unlike musical compositions, voice (by 
itself) is not copyrightable.
108
  Instead, Waits was awarded 
damages for ―injury to his peace, happiness and feelings‖ as well 
as for ―his goodwill, professional standing and future publicity 
value.‖109  The court‘s reasoning and the jury‘s determinations 
indicate a desire to recognize and enforce the interests protected by 
moral rights, as opposed to focusing entirely on economic rights. 
 
 102 Id. at 1098. 
 103 Id. at 1096, 1098. 
 104 See id. at 1098. 
 105 Id. at 1100 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748). 
 106 Id.  
 107 Id. (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1988)); see 
also Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) (holding that imitation 
of unique voice could be actionable as unfair competition). 
 108 See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100.  Voice as such cannot be the subject of a copyright 
infringement suit because it is not copyrightable; recording of a voice is.  However, voice 
can be recognized as a distinct mark/attribution, which makes it more of a trademark 
issue, and can be the subject of an infringement suit.   
 109 Id. at 1103. 
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The second part of Waits‘ claim was brought under the 
Lanham Act.
110
  Here, Waits‘ claim was premised on ―the theory 
that by using an imitation of his distinctive voice in an admitted 
parody of [his] song, the defendants misrepresented his association 
with and endorsement‖ of the Frito-Lay chips.111  The court 
referenced cases of false endorsement claims brought by plaintiffs 
for the unauthorized imitation of their distinctive attributes, where 
those attributes amounted to an unregistered commercial 
trademark, and ruled in Waits‘ favor.112 
C. Separate Awards for Moral Rights and Copyright Claims 
In a comparable case brought by Waits in 2005, the Spanish 
court went a step further by expressly recognizing a violation of 
Waits‘ copyright and moral rights.  The suit involved a commercial 
for Volkswagen-Audi which was musically arranged like the Waits 
song and featured a Tom Waits vocal impersonator.
113
 A Barcelona 
court determined that Volkswagen-Audi and its production 
company ―were liable not only for copyright infringement, but also 
for violations of Waits‘ right of integrity for adapting his music 
and vocal stylings in [their] commercial.‖114  The Court ―protected 
Waits‘ ‗personality and reputation‘ as well as his copyright . . . 
[and] granted damages of 30,000 Euros for [his] moral rights claim 
and 36,000 Euros for [his] music publisher‘s copyright 
infringement claims.‖115 
By distinguishing Waits‘ rights from the copyrights held by his 
publisher, it is evident that the court regarded Waits‘ moral rights 
as separate and inalienable, distinguishing Waits‘ rights from the 
 
 110 Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).  The act prohibits the use of false 
designations of origin, false descriptions, and false representations in the advertising and 
sale of goods and services. 
 111 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106. 
 112 Id. at 1110. 
 113 S.A.P., Nov. 17, 2005 (No. 256/2004) (Spain), available at 
http://www.interiuris.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/WLES_07-15-2008_03_21.pdf. 
 114 Lucille M. Ponte, Preserving Creativity from Endless Digital Exploitation: Has the 
Time Come for the New Concept of Copyright Dilution? 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 34, 
66 (2009). 
 115 Id. (citing Tom Waits Wins Landmark Spanish Legal Judgment, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 
19, 2006), http://www2.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/ 
story/01-19-2006/0004263323&EDATE &EDATE). 
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copyright of his publisher. The Court of Appeals agreed with the 
trial court‘s determination that the song used in the commercial 
was in fact a substantially similar
116
 imitation of  Waits‘ song, 
therefore infringing the ―moral‖ interests Waits had in the song. 
In addition to his moral rights and copyright claims, Waits also 
sued under Spain‘s Unfair Competition Law.117  The Spanish Court 
of Appeals explained the complementary nature of intellectual 
property and unfair competition law in Spain.
118
  As both laws 
protect different interests, an accumulation of claims is permitted.  
In Spain, unfair competition law protects competition in the 
market, while the copyright act protects the interests of rights 
holders.  The court, therefore, dismisses claims of unfair 
competition when the affected parties are only the actors and 
copyright holders.
119
  As the only interests implicated in Waits‘ 
cases were those of the actor, Waits, the court dismissed the unfair 
competition claim.
120
 
D. Similar Court Conclusions Reached on Different Grounds 
Thus, although on different grounds, both the American and 
Spanish courts seem to have, in effect, reached a similar 
conclusion.  Based on the relationship Waits has to his work and 
because his songs can be seen as a unique personification of 
himself, they were accorded protection in both courts.  
Nevertheless, the threshold for protection articulated in the United 
States case appears to be higher than the one expressed in the 
Spanish case.  In Waits v. Frito-Lay, in order for a defendant to be 
found liable for voice misappropriation, the imitation has to be so 
good that ―people who were familiar with the plaintiff‘s voice who 
heard the commercial believed the plaintiff performed it.‖121  The 
voice that reminds an audience of or sounds like a plaintiff is not 
 
 116 See Lamonthe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1405 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988). 
In Lamothe, the Ninth Circuit stated that it does not express any opinion as to whether the 
Lanham Act incorporates a ―substantial similarity‖ requirement.  
 117 S.A.P., Nov. 17, 2005 (No. 256/2004) (Spain), available at http://www.interiuris. 
com/blog/wp-content/uploads/WLES_07-15-2008_03_21.pdf. 
 118 See generally id. 
 119 See id. 
 120 See id. 
 121 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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enough for liability.
122
  Alternatively, in Waits v. Volkswagen-
Audi, the court granted damages for Waits‘ moral rights claim that 
Volkswagen-Audi adapted his ―music and vocal stylings.‖123  The 
opinion suggests that it likely would be sufficient to find that 
people were reminded of Waits without having to believe that it 
was Waits himself.  This perfectly corresponds to the wording of 
the Spanish intellectual property law‘s definition of the right to 
integrity regarding modifications, assigning liability for any use 
―that is liable to prejudice his legitimate interest or threaten his 
reputation.‖124 
Furthermore, it seems that in practice, the gap in the theoretical 
framework between both systems would be even narrower if the 
alleged infringer was authorized to use the work under copyright 
law.
125
  Most common law courts have recognized that if a contract 
between the author and his licensee or assignee is silent as to the 
possible modification or other alteration of the work, ―the assignee 
or licensee of a copyright may not modify the work to the point 
where the publication of the modified work would harm the 
author‘s reputation, as that would amount to libel.‖126  Therefore, 
U.S. courts have used contract and defamation laws to, in essence, 
create a default rule protecting the moral right of integrity by 
prohibiting substantive modifications without prior 
authorization.
127
 
Moreover, decisions from the United States suggest that there 
are limits even to express contractual provisions which allow for 
modifications.  As early as 1952 the court explained: 
Whether the work is copyrighted or not, the 
established rule is that, even if the contract with the 
artist expressly authorizes reasonable modifications 
(e.g., where a novel or stage play is sold for 
adaptation as a movie), it is an actionable wrong to 
 
 122 See id. 
 123 See Ponte, supra note 114, at 66.  
 124 Spain‘s Intellectual Property Law, supra note 40, at 5. 
 125 See Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 367. 
 126 Id. at 389. 
 127 See id. 
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hold out the artist as author of a version which 
substantially departs from the original.
128
 
Hypothetically, if a licensee substantively modified Waits‘ 
song in the Volkswagen commercial, under the European concept 
of moral rights as being inalienable and protecting the authors, the 
courts would easily accord Waits his moral rights protection.  But 
even in the United States, the laws of contract and defamation 
might protect Waits‘ interests regardless of the existence of a 
provision allowing for modification.
129
 
Practical application of the general prohibition of modifications 
as contained in the right of integrity often results in a collision with 
the rights of third persons in the work of art in question.  European 
courts generally do not mechanically apply the rule prohibiting 
modifications.  These courts rely instead on a pragmatic ad hoc 
balancing of conflicting interests.
130
  Some European courts, as 
well as American courts, limit author‘s integrity rights when minor 
changes are made, especially when the changes are made to 
present the work in another medium.
131
 
E. United Kingdom as an Incentive and a Model for the United 
States 
The United Kingdom has long been reluctant to adopt broad 
moral rights protection.
132
  In 1988, the United Kingdom adopted 
the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act (―CDPA‖).133  In 2006, 
The Performances (Moral Rights) Regulations
134
 amended the 
CDPA and expanded moral rights to cover performances by 
 
 128 Id. at 390 (quoting Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 589 (2d Cir. 1952)). 
 129 This represents the core tension in the common law system, the balance between the 
author‘s rights and the rights of third parties, particularly copyright holders. 
 130 See Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 366. 
 131 See Piotraut, supra note 8, at 606. 
 132  Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 234.  
 133 Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 182D (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/contents. See also Bird & Ponte, supra note 
1, at 276. 
 134 Performances (Moral Rights, etc.) Regulations, 2006, S.I. 2006/18, art. 5 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/20060018.htm. 
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granting performers the rights of attribution and integrity, although 
they were limited in scope.
135
 
The 2006 amendments apply to sound recordings or 
performances offered over the Internet through legitimate music 
and video downloading services.
136
  The use of the Internet raises 
interesting cross-border challenges for the United States regarding 
the recognition of moral rights.  Legal actions can be brought 
against the United States recording and media industries in United 
Kingdom courts by British and European Union performers against 
the United States recording and media industries for violations of 
moral rights involving online distribution of songs, music videos, 
and sound tracks in films and television programs.
137
 
Although the United Kingdom‘s protection of moral rights 
does not rise to the level of Continental European protection, it 
represents a possible step taken by a common law country.  
Considering the expanding presence of the Internet, particularly for 
the music industry, this step should be taken by the United States. 
 
 135 Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 262–66.  There are many exceptions to the right of 
attribution and the right of integrity.  
The right of attribution for performers does not apply when it is not 
‗reasonably practicable‘ to identify the performer . . . and in cases of 
‗news reporting, incidental inclusion of a performance or recording‘ 
and governmental proceedings and inquiries . . . The integrity right 
does not apply to anything done to avoid illegal activity or to comply 
with a legal duty avoid illegal activity. . . . [I]t does not apply to 
decisions made involving the British Broadcasting Corporation where 
avoiding inclusion offends good taste or decency, implicates the 
encouragement of criminal acts, possibly leads to disorder, or maybe 
even offends public feelings . . . Furthermore, under this regulation, 
the performer or his successor may, at any time, waive in writing 
moral rights.  The waiver may be partial or complete, may relate to 
existing or future performances, or may be expressed as subject to 
later revocation.  
Id. 
 136  Performances (Moral Rights, etc.) Regulations, 2006, S.I. 2006/18,  182D (1A) 
(United Kingdom), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/section/ 
182D. See also Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 262. 
 137 See Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 262. 
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CONCLUSION 
Can the same level of protection as is accorded in jurisdictions 
recognizing moral rights be achieved through other legal concepts 
and institutes deployed in the United States?  Probably not.  Even 
if the courts come to realize that artists‘ control over their works 
needs to be protected, the existing legal concepts are not sufficient.  
It is important to realize that the lack of adequate protection of 
moral rights in the United States will continue to force American 
artists to seek the assistance of foreign courts and vindicate their 
rights in countries that more closely abide to international 
treaties.
138
  It is possible that the United States will face pressure to 
extend moral rights protections to musical works given the 
proliferation of online music services accessible worldwide.
139
  
Globalization and the expansion of the Internet, with its 
dissemination of downloadable music, might soon make moral 
rights of composers a necessity in the United States. 
This paper focused on the recognition of moral rights 
protection for musical compositions.  Other important 
considerations arise in the context of other works and the question, 
deserving further analysis, is whether all works should be entitled 
to moral rights protection, and if so, to what extent.
140
 
 
 
 138 See Bird & Ponte, supra note 1, at 233. 
 139 See id. at 230. 
 140 There is a strong claim that computer programs, databases, and other functional 
works are not appropriate for moral rights protection. See Piotraut, supra note 8, at 596 
(referencing MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 6, 369 (th ed. 
2005)).  Moreover, ―the substantive level of protection depends on the concrete rules that 
courts use to adjudicate moral rights claims, not on the analytical framework that is used 
to conceptualize, rationalize, or justify these rules.‖ Rigamonti, supra note 7, at 367. 
